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TAMING VIOLENCE: J
RICOEUR AND DERRIDA
Discussions of violence have recently taken a centra) role
in postmodern conversations of philosophy/nonphilosophy.
According to the usual script of deconstruction, the violence of
philosophy and of ontology and, indeed, of logos in genera) and
of all meaning fonnation is apower p)ay that must be subverted
by the deconstructive process. Within this general postmodern
conversation, Paul Ricoeur, in his own way, addresses the
phenomena that deconstruction indicates as violent, taking them
in a more positive way. In spite of this fundamental difference,
Ricoeur considers violence and language as contraries to occupy
the totality of the human field. In addition, for Ricoeur, violence
has a central role in the transition within ethics from the
teleological to the deontological, for the evaluative ethics of the
Aristotelian tradition is critiqued as not being able to deal
adequate)y with violence and evil.2
Within this broad context, we will focus first on postmodern
deconstruction's opposition to the vioJence of philosophy and
logocentrism; then we will consider the very violence latent
within the deconstructive process, beginning with that in relation
to a basic will to believe, contrasting this interpretation of
violence with the surplus of meaning considered not as violence,
hut rather as an attempt to render account of an excess or fullness
'In the prescnt treatise, violence will bc laken in its broadest sense, including
two ~xtremes: the violence one does to anothcr person, such as murder; and the
vloJence of nature, such as in hurricancs. avalanches or epidemics. lllis foUows the
brC'adth ofviolence that Ricoeur notes in the hcginning ofhis article. "Violence and
l.anguage.·' in Po!it;cul anti Social E:isay.'i hy Paul RicQeur (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
Unlversity Press, 1974), p. 88·89, (See above pp. 32 end 33J.
1Although the pJace of violence in his ethics is central. it will not be
consld~red as such in this article, since OUT scope i5 more general. For Ricoeur,
violencc and evil are what require the movc from the Aristotelian teleologicaJ
~thics to the normative moral philosophy of Kant. And in this context it is preciseJy
the violcnce that one does to another.
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ofscnse. Second, the violencc within deconstruction's diacritical
view of languagc and within its view of the living present will be
considercd, clarifying the fundanlcntal nature of the violence of
dcconstructioll. Finally, the role of violence in Ricoeur's
philosophy wilJ be considered, bcginning with the surplus of
meaning and violence, and taking into account the role of
violence in the living present and in language as discourse.
Thus t OUT thesis has cmerged: that deconstruction
misinterprets the relation between violence and language due to
its view ofthe Jiving present and sign, and that, with a revision in
this view of Janguage (sign, word, and discourse) and the living
present, the dialectic between violence and language can be
reread and replaced in a context that makes sense out of making
sense.
Deconstruction opposes not only the so caJled violence of
metaphysics, but also that of the pre-metaphysical.) A violence is
already detected in the Jogistic prejudice of Husserl in giving the
priority to the theoretical t and, in this context, wouJd be carried
forward to the later work on the pre-predicative. This leads to the
violence within the whole tradition that follows, giving the
priority to presence as in Heidegger's focus on the presence of
Being. Although Heidegger overcomes the theoretical priority of
Husserl, his fixation on presence, according to the standard recent
script, is a violence which replaces the former. As far as Levinas
is concemed, according to Derrida's interpretation, Heidegger, in
affirming the priority of Being over the existent and thereby
deciding the essence of philosophy, constitutes a kind of violence
to philosophy, due to the subordination of the personal relation
with someone, and of the existent in a possible ethical relation,
Uto 3 relation with the Being of thc existent, which, impersonal,
pennits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a
relationship of knowing),... :94 And Derrida interprets this
'Dcnida, "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference, trans.
AIBn Bass (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1978), p.87.
4Emmanuel Levinas. TOlality and Infinity: An Essay on Exter;ority, translated
by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duqucsne University Press, 1969), p. 45: quoted
in "Violence and Metaphysics" of Derrida, 97.
consideration of ontology to be first philosophy as apower play,
a philosophy ofpower.
Consistent with these considerations of violence is
deconstruction 's conviction that violence is done to the
exception, to those who do not fit the scheme of communally
accepted rationality and law, or the "rationalized community"s.
As Denida puts this: "Man calls himselfman only by drawing
limits excluding his other from the play of supplementary: the
purity of nature, of animality, prirnitivism, childhood, madness,
divinity. ,t6
Ultimately. one of the most general contexts of
vioJcnce according to deconstruction is found in Janguage,
which is the focus of this articlc. In referring to the relation
between violence and writing, Drucilla Comell, reflecting on a
basic point of Derrida, puts it weil in pointing out that there is
violcnce even in the writing which attempts, in institutions, to
overcome violence. The very institutions which aim to prevent
vioJence do so by enforcing a more subtle and basic expression
ofviolence, that ofthe institutionalization process itselfand that
of writing itself, and that of any organization of meaning,
thought or value into a network of any kind or into any systemic
view. Thus, writing and violence are associated. uWriting and
other fonns of 'representational' systems, whether they be
kinship systems or political institutions, are an attempt to defend
against human violence. But to the degree that the establishment
~Drucina Com~lI. The PlJilo.fOph)' 0/ Li,nil (New York and London:
Routl~dge. 1992). p. 49.
•Jacquc Denida, 0/ Grammalology. trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baitimore and London: The Johns Jlopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 244-245.
This Jast and most important kind of violence, that ofone person against another, is
not the focus of this paper, and thus will not be further discussed. YCl opposition to
It plays an essential ro1e in deconstruction and in Ricoeur's works. In this context,
in thC' account of the intcrTcJation among sight (le regard), sound and desire, any
neUb'ah1.ation of desire in favor of mere sight is a violence, the violence of the
"abstraction of se~lng."For respect. not on1y sight, hut also desire must be present,
hut a d('si~ which does not consumc. and adesire which gocs bcyond satisfaction
and is a true tuming the othcr way of desire. to transcendence, whlch does not ever
get satis'ied. Thus, this desire does not se~k to consume as do Hegclian desire and
nced, for it 15 beyond need and satisfaction.
of systems for ethicaI poIitical 'representation' identifies the
norm and rigidJy circumscribes the definition of right behavior,
such establishments carry within them their own violence. The
very power to name is for Dcrrida 'the originary violence of
language which consists in inscribing within a difference, in
cJassifying....To think the unique within the system, to inscribe
it there, such is the gesture of arche-writing: arche-violence.'
For DelTida, Rousseau's ethic of speech is a 'delusion of
presence mastered, ' a delusion that is dangerous because it
conceaIs or effaces the vioJence of Ianguage's classifying
power.'"
Continuous with this basic vioJence of language, Derrida
pinpoints two kinds of violence in a rather clear text
commenting on Benjamin, that of the founding or the setting up
of a law, institution, meaning, text, etc., and that of conserving
the same.8 This likewise applies to language, to setting up a
meaning or text, and conserving it in interpretations and
traditions. Deconstruction is supposed to expose such violence
passing under the guise of Jaw, meaning, systems, institutions,
etc. The very process of deconstructive reading itself exposes,
and at once undoes this violencc in the process of moving from
one reading to the other. It thus opens up possibilities beyond
the fixity which does violence. And it is precisely this process
'Drucilla Comell. The Phi/osoplly of Limit, p. 51. quoting Dcrrida. 0/
Grammatolog)', 112
"'For ~Y(lnd Benjamin's explicit purpo~c. I shall propose the interpretation
according to which the very violencc of the foundation or position of 1aw
(Reclll.\"etzende Gewalt) must envclop the violence of conservation
(RechtserhaltenJe Gewalt) and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of
fundamental violence that it eans for the repetition of itself and founds what ought
to bc conscrved, eonservable, promiscd to heritage and tradition, to be shared. A
foundation is a promise. Every position (Setzling) pennits and promises (pennet et
pro-met), it positions en met/anl et en prollleltrant. And even if a promises not kept
in fact, iterability inscribes the promise as the guard in the most irruptive instant of
foundation.....Position is already iterabiJity, a can for self-conserving repetition."
Jacqu~ Dcrrida. "Force of 1aw: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority...• in
Cardozo Law Review, vol. 1t. Nos.S ..(). This refcrence is simply to p. 997.
Quoted by Drucilla ComelJ, The Philosophy o[Limit, p. 162.
that makes sense out of the claim that "dcconstruction is
justice.u9 FOT. according to deconstruction, justice is a sort of
limit concept or, more precisely in Derrida's sense. is at the
lintit as something set in nlotion in the deconstructive process.
and not some closed up ideal or absolutely delinable concept.
This is the way in which justice is first freed from its union with
law, thus taking away its violence, and put in play at the
deconstructive level, preventing the violence of the law which is
set up and prolonged in violence. 1O And again the same applies
to meanings in a text.
Tbe double reading of deconstruction, or recognizing the
"double gesture" of deconstruction, does not exonerate
deconstruction from the accusation that it itself is guilty of
violence, as Drucilla Comell contends.
"
For one violence
perpetrated by deconstruction, although quite subtle, is
contained in the absolute claim that there necessarily is the
double reading, double gesture, eJlipsis, and in the attitude
toward not merely the failed systematization, but also toward
meaning itself, texts, and any instance of knowledge. And this
violence is radicaJly rooted in their initial stance, as will become
apparent in the following analysis, proceeding in a Jamesian
way.12
~da. "Force of Law." p. 945, quoted in ComelJ, Phi/osophy 01 Limit,
p.1S1
''These two kinds ofviolence are included in Caputo's attempt at an ethics of
obligation without or against ethics: UEthics contains obligation, but that is its
undoing (deconstruetion). Ethics harbors within itself what it cannot maintain, what
it must expet, expectorate. exclude. Ethics, one might say. cannot contain what it
conlains." John D. Caputo, Against Ethic;: Contribut;on.~ to a P(Jetics o/ObligatiolJ
wilh COMlonl Reference 10 DeconslruClion (Bloomington and IndianapoJis: Indiana
University Press, 1993), 1'.5. FOT Lcvinas. the face is the limit or al1 power aod of
all violence. since it is not in the world and since it opens and goes beyond the
totaJity.
"Drucil1a Comell, The PhilQsophy ()fLimil, p. 155.
UWilham James, 'The Will to Believe." in Pragmatinn: The Class;c
'I'ritings1 Edited by H.S. lbayer (New York: New American Library 1970), pp.
186-209.
Deconstruction can be seen to contain a latent and subtle
affirmation in common with Logocentrism especially in the
latter's philosophical and scientific expressions. It can be seen
that aJI expression of meaning, even of systems, all discovery in
knowledge and thinking, and all value, spring from a will 10
believe or a certain faith that we can arrive at a logos,
knowledge, and unconcealment that make sense, and that values
can be grasped and sought. At this point, deconstruction and its
opponents are within the same commitment of belief and are on
the same level of discourse~ for both affinn this coming to
logos. IJ It is here on this common ground that
deconstructionists have corne to what might be called a quasi
conversion, a complete change-about in their way of looking at
the whole enterprise of emerging meanings and values, so that
the post Copcmican revolution now becomes a post critical
conversion. 14 At this point~ following the faith in the sense of
logos, there is a complete about-face or transfonnation in
attitude, giving rise to a further interpretation of the logos
according to which it is incapable of doing justice to the
unfathomable abyss and is rather prone toward an inauthentic
power domination. It entails a closure of sense, an effect which
looses its fluidity. It is at this point that deconstruction attempts
to dismantle the status of the logos and knowledge within the
initial will to believe in the process of making sense, viewing
the process ofcoming to sense as a violence of closure.
Deconstructionists, then, cntails more than cognition in
their will to believe in cognition. There is a further commitment
1"ln fact the eritieal philosophy of modcmity arose in the attcmpt to check
and limit reason's self-assurance, espeeially in the eontext of the success of science.
WMn onee thesc have been attained to some degree or sophistication (e.g., in
science, in philosophy], we can be thrown back to relleet on the precognitive and
prephilosophical level, and need to diseover nnd to aecount more explieitly for that
Verj level within the scope ofthe enlightcning process itse1f.
141t might bc worth recalling the role, for Kant, ofthe Critique o[Judgmenl in
estahlishing a strietly Iimited basis or the {"ritienl philosophy in reflective judgment
In purposiveness and all to which that leads - 811 outside any knowledge claims.
And this is the presupposcd element for all empirieaJ science, the transcendental
conditions or which have bem established in thc First Critique.
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to the belief in closure intrinsic to such logos, to the priority of
this closure over sense, and to the priority of the flux. Thus,
deconstruction brings excess baggage to the will to believe in
logos and cognition, constituting a priority of the
nonlogocentric, and thus introducing a negative violence into
the process. The ultimate issue, then, is that the will to believe
of deconstruction, while affirming first the logos through which
one must pass, reveals a comnlitment to the priority of a
concomitant closure, to its absolute status in relation to the
abyss, and therefore to a nonlogocentrism in opposition to a
so-called violence of )ogocentrism. This can be seen to be a
misplaced violence. Protesting that its opponents have not
grasped their thinking, it is clear that their very protestations
reveal an underlying prejudice, as absolute in its claim as it is
illusive and unattainable: a belief in the undccidable, the
inexpressible, the abyss. And to this it is best to reply with an
alternate belief, one which makes sense out of sense, while at
once seeing and admiUing its limits, but with an openness
beyond the initial limit. This limit, then, while initially a certain
kind of closure entailed in the coming to light of logos, is
likewisc an openness to its own very source for constant and
ongoing renewal in a process of interpretation. Thus, its
openness consists both in bringing to light, and, at once,
openncss toward renewal in its rich source, thus, in its own way,
taking into account the closure of limit. In this light, the
deconstructive sense of the primacy of closure can be seen to do
violence, from the outside. to the tendency to light, meaning,
truth, and values. If, indeed, theTe 1S a violence in this process,
it is positive, resting precisely in thc capture of meaning, rather
than in the emergence and closure as negative.
We must now turn our attention toward the two pivotal
points relevant to the difference between Ricoeur's view of the
relation between violence and language and that of
deconstruction: the treatment of time and that of sign. For, on
the one hand, deconstruction is committed to the discreteness of
time, arising out of its interpretation of the living present as
violent, and to a diacritical view of signs in language where
sense is already a manifestation of violence, while Ricoeur, by
contrast, and in a different will to believe, accepts a
phenomenological priority of time and a semantic priority in
language that requires a place for the word and not just for signs
in diacritical relations. Ricoeur thus puts the dialectic between
language and violence in a different realm of discourse. We
must pursue further these two points, first, the living present and
then sign, revealing two differing views of violence in relation
to language.
Derrida puts the nonperception and nonpresence of
retention on the same side as that of reproduction, thus placing
an alterity within the living present and constituting the living
prescnt as violent. IS "The living prcsent springs forth out of its
nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional
trace. It is always already a trace.,,16 Thus deconstruction has
wedged aseparation into the center of the living present,
making two alien and discrete parts out of the duration of the
"thick now." This view ofthe broken and violent living present,
resulting in a discreteness of time, underlies a view of sign
which reinforces this critique of Ricoeur's so called closure, and
thus making it possible for Ricoeur to corne under fire for
attempting aso called "taming oftime."
For deconstruction, the meaning ofthe sign emerges from
its difference from other signs, and the signified can itself
become a signifier, thus showing the collapse of the radical
"Jacque Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics;' p. 133: "In the last analysis,
if one wishcs to detennine violence as the nccessity that the other not appear as
what it is, that it not be respected except in. for, and by the same, that it be
dissimulated by the same in the very frceing of its phenomenon, then time is
vioJence. This movement of freeing absolute alterity in the absolute same is the
movement of temporalization in its most absolute unconditioned universal fonn:
the living present. I f the Jiving present. the absolute fonn of the opcning of time to
thc other in itself. is the absolute fonn of egological life, and if egoity is the
absolute ronn of experience, then the present, the presence of the present, and the
presalt of presence, are all originally and forever violent. The living present is
originally marked by death. Presmce as violence is the meaning of fmitude, thc
meaning of meaning as history."
16Jacque Denida, Speech and PhelllJmena: And otlJer Esj'ays 01 Husserl's
Theory o[ Sign.,.. trans. David B. Al1ison and Newton Garver (Evanston:
Northwestem University Press, 1973), p. 85.
distinction made by de Saussure between signifier... signified.
The meaning of a sign, rather than immediately present as
Husser} and de Saussure thought, is constituted by a 'tissue of
differences,' a network of referrals, and every so called simple
tenn IS marked by the trace of another ternl. Ilence a sign
aJready differs from itself before any act of expression. Thus, no
particular sign can be considercd to refer to any particular
signified, a sign cannot have a unique meaning (it is
undecidable), and the system of signifiers cannot be escaped.
That we cannot escape the system of signifiers and that no
particular sign can be considered to refer to any particular
signified leads to the conclusion that theTe is no presence to
meaning in the usual sense within language; no presence to
consciousness or to things. Rather, rneaning transpires in the
"play that is the web of language."17 Thust deconstruction
(Derrida) can be seen to deny the accessibiJity of the present
and of presence. For everything transpires within language
constituted by the network or system of signifiers. There is no
escape from the system of signifiers. This entails a view of
language from which meaning, in a different sense from that of
any usual semanties, emerges. For, deconstruction begins with
the subordination of semantics in thc traditional sense to syntax,
and the development of a view of syntax quite different from its
usual sense. From such a syntax, as the root of the fonnal
dimension of language, the semantic dimension emerges.
Thereforct Derrida subscribes to a new and far more radical
sense of syntax than that of syntax as fonn in contrast to
content. Rather, for hirn, syntax is the condition making
rneaningful language possible and, at once, is itself productive
of the semantic dimension of language. This has been referred
to as a "syntax of syntax" from which the "formal syntactic
properties can be syntactically composed and decomposed.ttl8
11Jacques Dmida, Position.. trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. ]981), 19.
"Rodolphe Gasche ttlnfra~tructures and Systematicity," in Deconstruction
Ulld Pllilo.foplly: n,e Text.f 0/Jacqlle... J)('rrü/a, cd. by John SalJis (Chicago: The
lJnivcrslty of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 11-12.
This reduction to syntax liberates the signifier from the
"oppressive regime" 19 ofthe violence ofpresence as immediacy
and at once ties it to the time flux over against structure or
meaning. For. if s~tax is prior to semantics und there is a
"syntax of syntax," 0 then thc tlux of syntax, the diachronic, is
in no way tied to or subordinatcd to semantics or 10 meaning, or
to the structure of the system of language. Rather, it generates a
kind ofmeaning in 'the vcry positioning ofsuch words as "green
is or:' thus moving away fronl structuralism in favor of the flux
undertying meaning and languagc. It has lost, however, the
continuity and depth of livcd tinlc. While disavowing the living
present and the word as doing violcnce to the instant and to sign
as diacritical, deconstruction itsclf does violence to language
and to the living present, as will become ever more clear.
Before tuming to Ricoeur's view of the language and the living
present as the context for the dialectic of violence and language,
abrief account of deconstruction's critique of Ricoeur is
neccssary to fully grasp his position in response.
Ricoeur's view of interpretation, of meaning, and of
language have been critiqued for interpretive closure, and thus
violence, in texts. An interpretation can be considered closure
because it helps conserve the meaning set up. However, Ricoeur
recognizes the richness of the concrete and existential to the
extent of emphasizing the conflict of interpreting the same
symbolic texts or narratives. Deconstruction (here, especially
David Wood21 ) challenges Ricoeur's attempts to address time
and narrative, proposing that there might be other ways in
which language resolves the aporias of time if the closure of
language and of time is interpreted differently or is
19John Caputo, "The Economy of Signs in Husserl and Derrida: From
Uselessness to Full Employment,.. in Deconstruction and Philosoplzy: The Texts o[
Jacques Derrida, p. lOS. .
~odolphe Gasche, "Infrastructures and Systematicity," p. 12.
llCf. "Introduction: Interpreting narrative," David Wood, in On Paul
RicOf!Ur: Narrative and Interpretatioll, edited by David Wood (London and New
York: Routlcdge, 1991)
~I
deconstructed. It is clear that deconstruction has opted for a
view of metaphoT, and, indeed, of language as such. which calls
for an interruption, rather then a syn'thesis, within a view of
language as a system of signs. Wood asks: t'Is not Ricoeur
putting a brave face on timets reassertion of its power to disrupt
all attempts at conceptual domestication?,,22 Wood wants to
interpret Ricoeurts attempt as one in which the "presumption of
synthcsizing thought is confronted by apower that exceeds it,u2J
and thus runs up against the limits of the power of narrative to
tarne time. As he says: Itmight it not be that narrative is
committed to the possibility of a certain closure of meaning,
which will inexorably be breached. ttl4 And Wood proposes that
phenomenological and cosmic time are two discrete and
aulonomous dimensions of the real, and not two partial models
of the real. By extension, the same critique, in a more general
way, could be made of Ricoeur especially in the context of his
ethicomoral position in that he operates within the closure of
language, tradition, institutions, etc. He is in need of being
deconstructed in terms of the ellipsis to be found necessarily,
according to the deconstructionist conviction, in his texts, by
means of the double reading. At this point, in the attempt to
respond to this critique, we must turn to Ricoeur's rieher and
more viable account of language and time, the possibility of
whose account rests on a completely opposed view of sign and
the living present.
The relation between language and violence is quite
different for Ricoeur than that of deconstruction seen above. For
Ricoeur, it is in discourse that violence has its contrary, and it is
the spoken word that bears the dialectic of meaning and
violence. ULanguage [Le langage]is innocent - Ianguage
meaning the tool, the code - because it does not speak, it is
spoken. It is discourse that bears the problem that we are
11 Wood. On Paul Ricoeur. p.5.
II Wood. On Paul Ricoeur, p. 5-6.
1·Wood, On Pau/ Ricoeur, p. 6.
considering."l~ It would seern that deconstruction, in contrast,
puts violence in language not merely as spoken, but also and
especially in writing, and in any corning to rneaning. We must
see the precise difference of focus here. While for
deconstruction violence is intrinsic to the process of coming to
meaning and to the so-called closure entailed in this process, in
contrast, for Ricoeur, violence is opposed by spoken discourse.
Ricoeur, however, seems to conle close to deconstruction in
saying that "The poet is thc violent man who forces things to
speak. It is poetic abductioll."Ut Yct, this is not at all the closure
of deconstruction, but, rather, the force of bringing something to
openness. Poetic and coherent speech, arising from the desire
for meaning, allows being and meaning to emerge. In contrast,
the collapse of language into a diacritical system of signs does
not advance us even one step in the direction of rational
meaning, hut rather, does vioJence to that very process. For
what Ricoeur considers to be in question is the "meaning of
discourse, not the structure of the keyboard on which it plays."27
And in the same vein, deconstruction becomes an accomplice of
violence in its move against semantics and meaning, and in its
subversion of the role of the subject.
Ricoeur could be considered to critique deconstruction's
initial move into language in the same way as he did that of
structuralism: that the projcct of Iinguistics which leads to
structuralism and deconstruction is misdirected inasmuch as
language as discourse. the saying of something to someone, is
lost and thus is violated. Further. it often overJooks the fact that
semiotics as sign th~ory cannot move to the sentcnce as the
URicoeur. UViolence and Language:' p. 91. (above p. 34.)
16Ricoeur, "Violence and Language:' p. 95. (above p. 37).
J1RicocW'. "Violence and Language," P. 98 [above, 39]. Ricoeur goes on:
··The problem of language in confrontation with violence is not the problem of
structure, but rather the problem of meaning, or rational meaning, that is to say. of
the cfTort to integrate in an inclusive understanding the relationship of man to
nature. of man to man, of existence and mcaning, and, f1nally, this vcry relation of
language and violence...
basic unity of meaning. As Ricoeur says: "The sentence is not a
largcr or more complex word, it is a new entity. It may be
decomposed into words hut the words are something other than
short sentences. A sentence is a whole irreducible to the sum or
its parts. It is made up of words, but it is not a derivative
fllllction of its words. A sentcncc is rnadc up of signs, but is not
itsclf a sign."28 Each stage - word, sentence, and text - is a new
stage requiring a new structure and description.
Ricoeur's insistence on taking language as discourse is
based on a radical disagreement with Ferdinand de Saussure's
fundamental distinction between la langue and la parole, which
does not leave room for language as discourse. Ricoeur's
disagreement with this distinction between la langue and la
parole, more radical than the critique of de Saussure by Derrida
regarding signifier and signified, emerges in his attempt to go
beyond the opposition between semeiology and the
phenomenology of language. He considers the unity of language
(Ie langage) fundamental to both, unifying them in a hierarchy
of levels: "To think language (Ie langage) should be to think the
unity of that very reality which de Saussure has disjoined - the
unity of language (la langue) and speech (la parole). ,,29 Thus, in
order to overcome the opposition by an interarticulation in
language, Ricoeur bases his view on a unity of language which
does justice to both the semeiology that takes la langue as an
object, as welt as to a phenomenology of speech. His intent is to
avoid that initial separation between language (la langue) and
speech (la parole) as a false dichotomy. The new unity must at
the same time allow for the possibility of viewing language as
an object of science and, at once, also allow for the event of
communication. And the unity which he has mentioned
surpasses the opposition betwecn these aspects of language,
thereby making possible a way of interarticuJating them.
The new unity of Janguage on the side of semantics gives
l'PauJ Ricoeur. Interpretation n,eol)': Dircoun;e alld the Surplu.r 0/
Meaning. (Fort Worth. Texas: The Texas Christian Univcrsity Press, 1976, p. 7.
l·Paul Ricoeur. The Conjlict tJ/J"terpn'ltltiofU, p. 80.
the primordial role in Janguage theory to semantics rather than
semeiology and syntax, especially in the restricted sense of
deconstruction. There are several reasons for understanding this
unity to be on the side of discourse, function, and semantics.
First, all roads lead from semantics in the sense that a11 sciences
of language presuppose, at least implicitly, the semantic
function. Further, by putting the unity on the side of semantics
in the sentence, both sides of the antinomy or opposition can be
articulated; and finally, by putting the unity in the sentence, an
articulation of the hierarchicaJ levels of language is seen to
make sense. And this hierarchy of levels, in spite of a break
within them, makes possible the interarticulation of various
approaches. This break, constituted by the system of signs of
semeiology (including that of deconstruction), reflects the
different ways of considering the sign and the transition from
semeiology to semantics.30
The same signs can be considered from two distinctiveJy
different points of view: one focusing on the relation of the sign
to the system of signs, and the other focusing on its function in
the sentence. To oppose sign to sign is the semi%gical
function, and to represent the real by signs is the semalltic
function. And the first function serves the second. The sign is
"meaningless" in the semeiology of structuralism and
deconstruction. On the other hand, the sign is word in
semantics. "Words are the point of articulation of the
semiological and the semantic in each event of speech.")) We
~is break and the transition are discusses in the following text: Moreover,
these two scimces are not just distinct, but also reßcct a hierarchical order. The
object of semiotics - the sign - is merely virtual. Only the sentence is actual as the
very evmt of speaking. This is why there is no way of passing from the word as a
lexical sign to the sentence by mere extension of the same methodology to a more
complex entity. The sentence is not a larger or more complex word, it is a new
entny. It may be decomposed into words. hut the words are something other than
short sentences. A sentence is a wholc irreducihle to the sum of its parts. It is made
up of words, hut It is not a derivative function of words. A sentence is made up of
si~'Ils. hut it is not Itself a sign." Paul Ricocur,IIIlerprelalio/l Theory, p. 7.
"Rlcoeur, Conflicl 0/ JIIll!rprf.'ltllio".. p. 93. We will now turn to Ricoeur's
vlew of time underlying signs and words.
will now turn to Ricoeur's view of time underlying signs and
words. J2
Ricoeur picks up on two central points of Husserl's inner
time consciousness overlooked in deconstructive
interpretations: first, HusserJ's inner time - consciousness is a
continuum containing continuance, a fact which Ricoeur quite
correctly makes central; and second, the overall problem which
is addressed and which retention so)ves is that of duration as
such. Ricoeur insists that the "now" for Husserl cannot be
considered a point-like instant, which is precisely what
deconstruction wants to do. Ricocur considers Dcrrida to stress
the "subversive aspect of this solidarity bctwccn the living
present and retention as regards the primacy ofthe Augenblick,
hence the point - like present, identical to itself:,33 While
Ricoeur takes into account Husserl's "strong sense" given to the
distinction between the present and the instant, he is firmly
opposed to pJacing the nonperception of retention on the same
side of othemess as that of recollection since retention is seen in
phenomenological description to be essentially different from
recolJection. Retention is continuous with perception, while
recollecrion in the "strong sense" of the word is a
nonperception. A similar critique could be levied against
Derrida's interpretation of retention as nonpresence. For
Ricoeur's interpretation agrees that the non presence of retention
i8 not to be equated with the nonpresence of second memory or
recollection.
Thus, Derrida, in picking up on the wrong side of the
tension between the living present and the instant in Husserl's
ambiguous treatment, has focused on the flux of time as discrete
and represented or repeated. For Denida "signification is
formed only within the hollow of differance: of discontinuity
and of discreteness, of the diversion and the reserve of what
UFor Ricoeur's tuming to ethics from his critique of Heidegger's sense of
time, see: Thomas P. Hohler, "From Being to Ethics: The Time of Narration,"
International Sludies in Philosophy, XXVII, pp. 21-43.
HRicoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 111, p. 283, note 12.
does not appear."l4 Differance can thus be seen to make
signi fication possible because of the interval which separates
the present from alterity. In this way nothing precedes
dijJerance. JS What becomes clear is that if one begins with
discreteness, the only alternatives are either pure identity or dire
altcrity. If one rcjects, as Dcrrida rightly does, the nltemativc of
pure identity. then his deconstructive stance is the logical
conclusion. What has been lost in favor of this superimposed
discrete time IS the lived time as a sense of human concrete
existence, which, as such, Is continuous, has duration, and
moves as a whole. Further, one must realize that the instant as
such does not exist since it is an abstraction from the continuum
or, at best, as Husserl uses the term, merely the occasion within
the continuum for the beginning or starting point of something
in an experience. In addition Ricoeur's account of the temporal
context for understanding language undercuts Derrida's pseudo
alternatives of signs or presence, for the temporal span of the
present is neither pure identity nor pure alterity. Tbe very
present, as thickened by retentions and protensions, "intends"
the future in light of the past. Since the very function of the
present is to mean and the very nature of presence requires
signs. language and signs are inseparably intertwined with time.
Tbus, it is clear that the critique by deconstruction of
Ricoeur's so called closure makes sense only if one ignores or
disagrees with Ricoeur's view of the semantic priority in
language and continuity in time. Ricoeur does not allow for an
ellipsis, which absolutely presupposes a priority of the flux and
a dethroning of semantics and is thus itself violent, but, rather,
only for a sort of imbalance due to the fullness of meaning in
experience and existence. His belief, however, and admittedly
only a belief Iike that of deconstruction, favors making sense in
making sense; values in evaluating; and responding to the face
~Jacques Derrida. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(ßaltimorc: Johns lIopkins University Press), p. 69.
'~Jacques Derrida, Position, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981), p. 28.
of the other responsibly and personally. And in the process, his
vicw of these does not do vioJence to them as does
deconstruction, and, at once, he reads the relation of violence
and Ianguage in a way that does justice to them without
violating them.
The fundamental point at issue here is whether the
deconstructive turn in moving against such elements provides a
view of time and sign in language able to sustain anything about
saying something to someone. Further, it seerns that obligation
and responsibility, even as taking place in the collapse of
reason, and without why, must be constituted in lived
expcrience, just as any meaningful communication involving
language must have continuity to sustain a viable view of
language to which trace is so important, and must presuppose a
semantic dimension able to carry, even indirectly, the message
of the discourse. It is precisely the priority of the semantic and
the continuity of time which allow a meaningful sense of
philosophy of limit. It is not merely a delimiting of sense as
cJosure hut a reaching through sense, taking account of the
tension between the fuJJness of sense and its various levels of
articulation, which does not succumb to the closure in a
reduction to the virtual and empty sign.
We have seen that, instead of considering violence to be
intrinsic to sense, to the living present, to presence and to
anything established, it becomes necessary to see the violence
intrinsic to the very deconstructive process itself, to clotural
reading, in its priority given to the closures of sense, time, sign,
presence: i.e. in the view that anything that is produced by the
flux other then the undecidable is violent. Thus, we have seen
that violence is intrinsic to the whole deconstructive process at a
basic level. In contrast to deconstruction, Ricoeur's priorities, as
seen, do allow for saying something to someone and for a viable
semantic and ethical framework for reflection today.
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